No SDES-2023-7
Title Intergenerational sustainability dilemma and a potential resolution: Future ahead and back mechanism
Author Shibly Shahrier, Koji Kotani, Tatsuyoshi Saijo
Abstract We examine whether the future ahead and back (FAB) mechanism improves intergenerationalsustainability (IS) in competitive societies, conducting lab-in-the-field experiments ofIS dilemma games. In baseline, each generation of three members in a lineup decides between maintaining IS (sustainable option) and prioritizing their payoff by imposing costs on subsequentgenerations (unsustainable option). In FAB, members in each generation first role-play those in the next generation, requesting what they want the current generation to choose. Second, they decide between two options as the current generation. Results demonstrate that FAB enhances IS, changing generations of proself people to choose sustainable options.
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